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This paper studies the effects of immigration on the wages of Argentinean native 
workers over the period 1993-2012. I use a novel micro-dataset which combines 
household surveys from Argentina and six other Latin American countries. 
Immigration from these six countries accounts for 95% of the total immigration 
from Latin American countries. The empirical strategy identifies the effects of 
the labour supply variation using the “national approach” from Borjas (2003) and 
a reduced form equation obtained within a CES framework. In order to account 
for demand/pull shocks, I propose a set of instruments based on labour market 
conditions in immigrants’ home countries. An alternative specification also 
explores the hypothesis of heterogeneous impact by country of origin. Overall, 
findings show a significant negative impact of immigration on wages. IV 
estimates suggest that OLS results are a lower bound for the (partial) causal 
effect. Thus, if confounding demand factors exist, they bias the results toward 
zero. 
 
During the last years there has been an active debate about the effects of 
immigration on the labour market, particularly on the impact on the wage structure 
of native population. Borjas (2003) develops a framework to account for such impact 
evaluating immigration as a labour supply shock for workers with similar 
characteristics. In two recent works, Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) 
and Ottaviano and Peri (2005) extend the standard setting to allow for imperfect 
substitution between migrants and natives. Both papers find evidence of imperfect 
substitution and a low impact of immigration on the wage structure of natives for 
the UK and the US. Peri and Sparber (2009) conclude that the lack of substitution 
between natives and immigrants could be driven by differences in linguistic abilities 
and other cultural dissimilarities. A natural follow-up question arises about the 
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effects of immigration in countries with higher rates of immigrants’ assimilation and 
fewer differences with their home cultures.  
Most of the academic debate about immigration has been focused on traditional 
corridors like Mexico-US and other South-North corridors. However, South-South 
migration has interesting characteristics and may contribute to the debate about the 
impact of immigration. Particularly, cross-border migration to Argentina has not 
received much attention in the academic literature. Few descriptive works exists 
about immigration in this corridor and no work attempted to estimate the causal 
impact on the local labour market. The magnitude of migration flows to Argentina 
was significant in the last decades. Jachimowicz (2006) estimates an average inflow 
of 15.000 permanent migrants per year between 1995 and 2002. According to the 
2010 census, approximately 5% of the total population in Argentina is foreign and 
81% of this group migrated from Latin American countries. In some areas this value 
increases notably, for instance, foreign population in Buenos Aires city represents 
13.2% of total population. 
There are some characteristics that make this corridor an interesting case of 
analysis. First, all the countries in the region (with few exceptions) have a common 
language and cultural barriers seem to be lower than in other corridors. Moreover, 
this characteristic has a methodological advantage: Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) 
and Dustmann and Preston (2011) conclude that language differences reduce the 
ability of immigrants to find a job that suits with their education and experience. 
The “downgrading effect” produced by language violates the identification 
assumptions of common approaches. Second, legal barriers to immigration are much 
weaker than the case of US or UK policies and illegal immigration is presumably 
lower. Third, during the last decades, most immigrants arrived from a small group 
of countries. Finally, the composition of immigrant population by country of origin 
has changed drastically over time.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in different ways: First, it is the 
first empirical work addressing the impact of immigration on the labour market in 
this important corridor. I address specific problems and characteristics related to the 
South- South corridors, for instance, internal migration and native emigration are 
recognised as confounding factors of the causal impact. Second, in order to isolate 
supply shocks from demand/pull factors, I propose a set of instrumental variables 
using a novel micro-database with harmonized socioeconomic information from six 
LAC countries. These countries accounts for 95% of recent Latin American migration 
toward Argentina. This paper also explores the hypothesis that the effect on wages 
varies by country of origin under imperfect substitution among immigrants. This is 
particularly interesting in the case of Argentina since the composition of 
immigration has been changing during the last 20 years. Indeed, some countries like 
3 
 
Paraguay, Bolivia and Peru have notably increased their share in total Latin-
American immigrant population.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the CES 
framework and the wage equations for natives and immigrants. Section 3 describes 
Data. Section 4 briefly summarizes the evolution of immigrant flows to Argentina 
and discusses some facts and evidence of this process. Section 5 discusses the 
baseline empirical setting and alternative identification strategies like IV and 
geographical stratification. Section 6 presents all the results and Section 7 
summarizes the main conclusions of this work. 
 
 
Consider a version of the model proposed in Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth 
(2012) which in turn is based on the model in Card and Lemieux (2001). Firms 
produce using a neoclassical production function that combines labour and capital. 
For simplicity, assumes that it can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas function with 
neutral technological change: 
(1) 1
t t t t
Y A K L   
Capital can be assumed either fixed in the short run or endogenous in the long run 
but exogenous from the point of view of a firm deciding the composition of the bundle 
of labour inputs. Labour is a composite input that aggregates different skill groups 
(indexed by e) using a CES technology: 
(2) 
1
1
E
t et et
e
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


 
  
 
  
where 1 1t  is the usual normalization for the relative efficiency parameters. 
Substitution between different education groups is measured by the elasticity of 
substitution 1/ (1 )E   . Similarly, etL is composited by different experience groups 
a=1,..,A.  
 (3) 
1
1
A
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  
 
 ,       1,...,    ;    1,...,e E a A  
The relative efficiency parameter eav  is assumed to be time invariant and 1ev is 
normalized to one. The elasticity of substitution across experience groups is equal to 
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1/ (1 )A   . Finally, native and immigrant sub-population are (potentially) 
imperfect substitutes: 
(4) 
1
eat neat eat meat
L L b L       ,        1,...,    ;    1,...,e E a A  
where 
nL is the native sub-population and nL is the immigrant sub-population and 
parameter 
eat
b accounts for differences in efficiency units provided by immigrants. 
Substitution between natives and immigrants is equal to 1/ (1 )M   . Assuming 
competitive markets, wages are equated to marginal productivity for each type of 
worker.  
(5) 1
neat t et t et ea eat neat
w Y L L v L L      
(6) 1
meat t et t et ea eat eat meat
w Y L L v L b L      
The empirical version of equations (5) and (6) can be easily derived, consider for 
example the log-transformation of (5): 
(7)  log log ( )log ( )log ( 1)log
neat t et ea t et eat neat
w Y v L L L L           
where log  , etc. Even though the terms  , tY , et and eav  can be absorbed by a 
set of dummies and interactions, equation (7) cannot be directly estimated by OLS 
since for example 
eat
L only can be calculated when there is an available estimation of 
δ. Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) propose an econometric procedure to 
estimate the structural version of a similar model in several steps, that approach is 
briefly discussed in section 5 but beyond the scope of this paper.2 
This simple CES framework is the base of the empirical strategy discussed in 
Section 5 and is has been widely used in recent literature because it allows for a high 
degree of flexibility in terms of substitution across education and age dimension but 
only imposes a low number of parameters to estimate. The main disadvantage of the 
nested CES approach is that substitution within education or age dimension is 
constant, for instance, the substitution degree between workers with high and 
medium education is assumed to be the same than substitution between workers 
with high and low education. Section 5 describes an empirical strategy to identify 
                                                                    
2 An analogous wage equation to (7) holds for immigrants under the assumption of no market 
discrimination against them. However, if this (negative) discrimination premium is assumed 
to be proportional to the counterfactual wage in a scenario without discrimination, a simple 
reinterpretation of the constant term can accommodate this problem. In other words, 
  log logm D , where D is the proportional discrimination adjustment. 
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some aspects of this model without relying on the structural estimation of all the 
parameters.  
 
 
The basic model assumes that immigrants are perfect substitutes independently 
of the country of origin. There are many reasons to believe that migrants from 
different countries are not perfect substitutes. First, countries of origin are 
heterogeneous in terms of culture, education quality, and other unobserved variables. 
Second, even though this model takes into account differences in education and 
experience, selection in unobservables (Borjas, 1987) is a potential source of 
heterogeneity between workers from different countries. For example, sorting across 
sectors seems to be very different for workers from different countries, indicating 
some unobserved differences between migrants with same education/experience but 
different nationality (Patel and Vella, 2007, Toussaint-Comeau, 2007).  
To allow for imperfect substitution across nationalities, I assume that immigrant 
population can be aggregated by means of a CES technology with substitution3 
1/ (1 )J   :  
(8)  
1
1
J
meat jmeat jmeat
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 
  
with 1meatc normalized to one. In this case, theoretical wages also varies within cells 
with the supply of workers from countries of origin j=1,…,J. The reason to allow 
jmeatc  
to vary along time is that immigration waves from the same country can change in 
terms of efficiency units because different economic or legal conditions in origin and 
destination can change the self-selection patterns (Longhi and Rokicka, 2012). First 
order conditions, assuming no discrimination against immigrants, imply that wages 
for each education-age-immigrant group are given by: 
(9) 1
jmeat t t et t et ea eat eat meat jmeat jmeat
w Y L L L a L b L c L       
Although there is an extensive literature estimating the impact of immigration 
on wages, there are no attempts to identify heterogeneity of this impact by country 
of origin. The only exception (to my knowledge) is Bratsberg et al. (2011) who use a 
                                                                    
3  Alternatively, it can be assumed that 
1
1
( )
M
eat neat eat meatm
L L b L  

   with m indexing the 
immigrant nationality. This specification means that substitution between natives and 
immigrants is the same than substitution between two groups of immigrants.  
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panel dataset from Norway to test if immigration from Nordic and high income 
countries had a different effect than immigration from developing countries.   
 
The main source of data for this paper is the Socioeconomic Database for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), jointly developed by CEDLAS at the 
Universidad Nacional de La Plata (Argentina) and the World Bank’s LAC poverty 
group (LCSPP). This database contains information on more than 200 official 
household surveys in 25 LAC countries. All variables in SEDLAC are constructed 
using consistent criteria across countries and years, and identical programming 
routines 4 . In this paper I use micro-data for Argentina and a set of six Latin 
American countries that account for more than 95% of immigrant flows from the 
region. Most of the analysis is done using the Argentinean sub-sample but the IV 
strategy uses information at the level of the country of origin of the immigrants.  
The data covers the period 1993-2012. For comparison purposes, I restrict the 
sample for each country to those areas covered by the national household survey in 
the whole period of analysis. In the case of Argentina, only 18 large urban areas had 
information on immigration in the 1993 survey and I restrict subsequent years to 
the same geographical coverage.5 Micro-data for Argentina in the SEDLAC database 
corresponds to the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares officially carried out by the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC) since the 1980s.  In the case of 
Brazil I exclude Rural-North areas included since 2004 and I only use urban areas 
from Uruguay since rural areas were added in 2006. The case of Bolivia is more 
restrictive since only regional capital cities and the city of El Alto, were covered in 
1993 and I restrict the sample to these cities for all the available years. Since there 
is no available information for Peru before 1997, I use the 10% census IPUMS extract 
for 1993. To keep consistency and comparability across years I harmonize the Census 
data applying the same methodology and definitions than SEDLAC database. 
Unfortunately, income information is not available for Peru 1993 Census data. Table 
1 reports data availability for each year and country included in the sample. 
It is worth mentioning that the official EPH survey from Argentina was carried 
out in two rounds (May and October) until 2003 but SEDLAC database only contains 
the October round for that period. On the other hand, SEDLAC micro-data is 
                                                                    
4  A detailed description of the methodology and definitions is available at 
http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/methodology.php 
5 The geographical coverage of the survey was extended from 15 urban areas in 1992 to 31 
urban areas in 2003. Nevertheless, the 18 areas included in 1993 account for 85% of the 
population in the latest years of the survey (which represents 70% of the total urban 
population in the country).  On the other hand, the share of urban population is estimated to 
be 87%.  
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available for both semesters since 20036. In order to keep consistency and exploit all 
the information available, I process and harmonize the May round of the EPH for 
each year within the period 1993-2003 using the same definitions and methodology 
than the SEDLAC database.  
Micro-data available for the covered period
 
 
Another difference between SEDLAC and the data I use in this work is that the 
former does not have detailed information on immigration. For that purpose, I 
identify immigrants by country of origin and year of arrival from the original EPH 
survey and match this information at individual level with the SEDLAC dataset.   
 
Argentina is a country with a long tradition in immigration inflows. European 
mass migration during the late 19th and the early 20th century has been considered 
among the largest population inflows experienced by a country (Hatton and 
Williamson, 1998). During that period Argentina implemented a set of active policies 
to incentive immigration. For instance, the Constitution from 1853 prohibited any 
barrier, tax or quota to European immigration. Census records show that the 
immigrant population increased from 210 thousands to 2.3 million between 1869 and 
1914. By that time, the immigrant share over total population reached 30%. 
European inflows started to decline after 1914 and virtually stopped in the late 
1950s after a short period of high inflows during the 5 years following the Second 
World War (Solimano, 2003).  
In the last decades, immigration from Latin American countries, particularly 
from Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, shifted the older European waves. 
As discussed in Pacceca and Courtis (2008) there was an important shift in the 
destination of Latin American immigrants before and after the 60s. The inflows of 
                                                                    
6 There is a methodological change from 2003 and now the survey is conducted over the whole 
year and reported in quarterly sub-samples. SEDLAC database groups the 4 subsamples in 
first and second semester respectively. 
Country/Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Argentina x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Bolivia x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Brazil x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Chile x x x x x x x x
Paraguay x x x x x x x x x x x x
Peru x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Uruguay x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Notes: Argentina : Each year pool first and second semester data except for 1993 and 2012 with only one semester available.
Bolivia : 2003 and 2004 unified survey. Chile : 1992 survey also included in the sample. Peru : 1993 correspond to the IPUMS
10%  census sample. Uruguay : 1992 survey also included
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workers before 1960 were concentrated in rural areas where the labour supply had 
dropped due to internal migration toward urban areas. Immigrants usually moved 
between locations and most of them frequently returned to their home countries. 
After 1960, most of the immigrants arrived to large urban areas and stay 
permanently. Political instability during the 70’s and 80’s in Uruguay and Chile7 
suddenly increased the share of immigrants from these countries whereas inflows 
from Bolivia and Paraguay have been continuously increasing since the 50s and in 
the case of Peru since the 80s in (Maurizio, 2007).  
During the last two decades, according with Census data, the number of 
immigrants born in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay increased 
from 817 thousands in 1991 to 1.4 million in 2010 (Castillo and Gurrieri, 2012). This 
increase was not monotonic along the period neither homogenous across home 
countries. The economic crisis in 2001 temporarily reduced the migration inflows, 
accelerated the number of immigrants who returned home and increased the 
emigration of native population.  After 2003 there is an important increase in the 
number of immigrants from Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru although the number 
of Uruguayan remains stable and the number of Chileans decreases. Overall, 
immigration from these six countries increased 39% between 2001 and 2010. Figure 
A1 in the appendix shows the distribution of immigrants by country of origin in 
South America according to the last Census. The figure also plots the geographical 
location of the 18 urban areas covered in the Argentinean sample.  
Beyond the after-crisis recovery of the Argentinean economy, the large increase 
in immigration during the last decade also coincided with the introduction of a new 
immigration law in 2004 (Law 25,871). The new law shortens the length of time 
required to obtain the Argentinean citizenship or the permanent residence 
permission, relaxes the requisites to obtain it and also legalizes the situation of 
thousands of immigrants who were not formally registered as workers. The previous 
immigration law dated from 1981 (during the military government) and was more 
restrictive, but in practice, the barriers to immigration were relatively low. The lack 
of frontier controls, the high level of informality in the labour market, regular 
amnesty laws (in 1974, 1984, 1992 and 1994) and the 1998 bilateral migration 
agreements with Bolivia and Peru, contributed to the low effectiveness of the 1981 
law8.  
                                                                    
7 Political instability characterized the whole region during these decades but the military 
coups occurred in 1973 in Uruguay and Chile were highly correlated with the sudden increase 
in the emigration rates from these countries (see for example Pellegrino and Vigorito, 2005) 
8 For instance, before 1994 it was possible for any immigrant to change the residence status 
from “temporary“ (tourists for example) to “permanent” without leaving the country. After 
1994 this process was more regulated although it was still feasible to remain in the country 
as a worker with a temporary permission. A whole analysis of the immigration laws since 
1876 can be found in Pacecca and Courtis (2008). 
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The rest of this section uses information from the dataset described in Section 3. 
The panel A of Table 2 shows the population represented in the sample of 18 larger 
urban areas considered in this paper. Individuals are classified by country and 
region of birth. During the period under analysis, native population living in the 18 
covered urban areas grew around 20% whereas the number of immigrants from 
Latin American countries increased almost 70%. These dissimilar changes boosted 
the share of LAC immigrants over total population from 3.4% to 4.5%  (Figure 1). 
The figures by country/region of origin from household surveys match the Census 
data. Immigration from Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay increases over the period, 
remains stable for Chile and decreases for Uruguay. European immigration 
decreases considerably but this effect is driven by the aging of the stock of Europeans 
who arrived to the country many decades ago. The largest group of immigrants is 
from Paraguay, followed by Bolivia and Peru. The number of immigrants drops 
between 2001 and 2004 for all countries except Bolivia and Peru. After 2004, 
immigration from all countries increases except from Chile where this value 
fluctuates more.  
 
 Native and Immigrant index (1993=1; left axe) and share of 
immigrants over total population (right axe). 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC and EPH. 
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No. of individuals (thousands) represented in the sample (1993-2012). 
 
 
The panel B of Table 2 shows the number of male workers with 18 to 65 years old 
represented in the survey. This subsample constitutes the basis of the analysis in 
this paper. Trends are similar than those discussed for total population. For this 
subsample, in 2012 the largest number of immigrants is from Bolivia and Paraguay 
Year
Native 
population
LAC 
countries
Bolivia Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay Europe
1993 16,399 563.4 103.5 103.0 187.6 21.0 119.6 559.8 3.2%
1994 16,633 563.1 96.4 102.9 193.5 24.2 122.6 543.3 3.2%
1995 16,988 608.4 103.3 121.6 221.3 32.5 105.6 520.6 3.3%
1996 16,781 617.0 102.8 128.4 216.4 27.0 119.3 493.3 3.4%
1997 17,554 691.8 134.7 151.6 208.1 26.5 148.4 487.5 3.7%
1998 18,294 724.0 141.6 141.2 238.4 46.4 134.6 459.7 3.7%
1999 18,609 746.0 137.5 132.9 270.0 64.7 114.2 423.5 3.8%
2000 18,890 730.6 127.0 118.8 261.4 84.5 110.4 389.8 3.6%
2001 19,217 740.6 138.0 114.8 282.5 77.6 95.4 353.7 3.6%
2002 19,509 743.1 188.1 112.6 261.5 64.7 89.2 365.5 3.6%
2003 18,941 726.4 179.9 103.6 232.6 81.9 104.9 353.4 3.6%
2004 18,821 695.4 161.2 105.3 247.3 79.8 81.2 287.7 3.5%
2005 18,958 761.5 195.7 103.4 263.1 76.3 99.0 283.3 3.8%
2006 19,119 818.2 216.6 92.4 285.0 92.9 103.9 263.2 4.0%
2007 19,209 897.9 247.0 86.5 262.7 155.3 107.7 249.7 4.4%
2008 19,421 870.2 195.9 91.1 305.6 120.6 121.5 261.4 4.2%
2009 19,598 879.2 209.3 107.4 312.3 116.7 91.8 253.5 4.2%
2010 19,808 881.3 221.0 110.2 322.0 119.3 72.2 232.5 4.2%
2011 20,009 881.4 203.5 106.4 309.1 127.3 91.2 211.4 4.2%
2012 20,068 945.8 228.6 95.5 322.0 154.2 91.0 212.4 4.4%
1993 3,588 171.2 27.6 35.7 53.1 11.2 41.7 100.5 4.4%
1994 3,574 179.0 31.5 31.9 58.7 10.9 42.7 100.3 4.6%
1995 3,470 174.4 33.1 35.3 57.3 10.6 35.4 93.7 4.6%
1996 3,442 174.9 33.1 37.5 52.7 9.3 37.5 80.6 4.7%
1997 3,728 210.9 40.5 44.8 58.6 8.4 54.9 84.6 5.2%
1998 3,900 213.7 34.9 44.0 71.7 10.6 48.9 86.9 5.1%
1999 3,903 212.3 37.7 41.9 70.6 18.9 40.2 74.2 5.1%
2000 3,917 211.3 37.4 37.0 69.1 25.1 38.3 58.3 5.0%
2001 3,836 199.2 37.2 33.1 69.7 17.5 33.6 41.9 4.9%
2002 3,720 197.3 51.5 28.5 60.9 21.3 29.1 40.6 5.0%
2003 3,907 193.6 54.4 22.5 53.8 20.0 35.8 48.3 4.7%
2004 4,179 212.5 51.4 34.2 77.0 20.3 27.5 35.9 4.8%
2005 4,300 235.2 61.0 34.0 75.7 21.6 37.4 37.9 5.1%
2006 4,409 247.4 66.0 29.6 81.8 23.1 39.6 37.2 5.3%
2007 4,531 249.9 74.7 27.7 63.9 34.4 38.4 36.8 5.2%
2008 4,584 260.7 63.9 29.8 81.3 31.4 47.3 34.5 5.3%
2009 4,615 244.8 61.4 31.9 81.3 30.7 30.0 35.2 5.0%
2010 4,766 255.4 66.8 31.1 89.8 35.4 24.2 20.4 5.1%
2011 4,898 262.5 68.5 28.8 83.3 33.3 37.9 15.6 5.1%
2012 4,778 268.1 75.3 20.3 72.5 42.3 43.0 27.6 5.3%
Notes: 18 major cities represented in 1993 survey. Source: Own calculations using SEDLAC and EPH.
A- Whole 
sample
Immigrants by country/region of origin Share 
LAC/total 
population
B- Sub-
sample       
of Men            
[18-65] 
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followed by immigrants from Uruguay and Peru. The percentage of Latin American 
immigrants in this subsample rose from 4.4% to 5.3% over the period under analysis.  
It is important to mention that these figures relies on household surveys data 
which is subjected to some methodological issues and higher measurement error 
than census data.9    
 
 
I follow Borjas (2003) and restrict most of the analysis for the subsample of men 
aged 18-65 who participate in the labour force, however, some specifications use 
information about men not active in the labour market. I also exclude from 
regressions (and estimations related to earnings) those individuals who report 
themselves as self-employed or those working at family firms without a well-defined 
salary. Following Card and Lemieux (2001) and Manacorda, Manning and 
Wadsworth (2012), I pool different years of the survey. Conversely to those works, I 
define the length of each period as 4 years (instead of 5) to be consistent with the 
distinction between new arrived and established immigrants defined for the same 
length.10 Consistently to the definition of periods, I categorize individuals in 12 age-
groups of 4 years each. This decision contrasts with Borjas (2003), Bratsberg et al. 
(2012) and Ortega and Verdugo (2011) who use experience instead of age. As pointed 
by Card and Lemieux (2001) using age has the advantage of comparing individuals 
who attended the same education level at the same time and therefore were 
subjected to the same influences regarding their education decisions. On the other 
hand, only potential experience can be identified in the data. Since there is not an 
obvious way of partitioning labour force into age/experience categories, I perform 
some robustness exercises in order to detect if results are driven by this specific 
partition.  
SEDLAC database define 6 levels of education which are homogeneous across 
years and countries. This is an important feature since questionnaires have 
undergone some changes in the educational module during the 20 years covered by 
this work. I group the 6 levels into 4 broader educational levels consistently with 
previous literature11. The categories are defined as 1) Primary education or no formal 
education; 2) High school dropouts; 3) High school graduates or college dropouts; 4) 
                                                                    
9 For household surveys analysis, comparison between ratios and proportions is more reliable 
than comparison between absolute values, particularly across years. 
10 After the second semester of 2003 the survey only allows to identify whether the immigrant 
arrived within 4 years before the survey or not.  
11 It is also inconvenient that partition into 6 education levels implies a large number of cells 
with zero immigrants and low number of natives. 
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Professionals or university graduates. These definitions are more suitable for 
Argentina than definitions used in Borjas (2003) for the US since a higher share of 
workers are concentrated in low educational levels.   
In order to relate as much as possible earnings with productivity (demand side) 
avoiding at the same time the indirect effect of changes in supply decisions through 
working hours, wages are defined as the total weekly earnings from the main 
occupation divided by the number of worked hours in that occupation during the 
week before the survey. In some specifications I also report monthly earnings from 
main occupation. An important caveat that should be considered is the comparison 
of wages across periods. The official Consumer Price Index reported by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos (INDEC) in Argentina has been severely criticized 
and widely discredited during the last few years due to a recurrently 
underestimation of the true inflation. This concern is particularly relevant for the 
last period considered in this paper (see for example Cavallo, 2013). For this reason 
I deflate wages in the period 2008-2012 using the average of the non-official CPIs 
reported by different private consultants.12 For the rest of the years I use the official 
CPI.13 I exclude from earnings estimations all the individuals with hourly incomes 
above $45 and below $0.2 (at 2010 prices).  
Individuals are classified as immigrants based on their country of birth 
irrespective of the age of arrival or their parents’ citizenship. Immigrants are 
considered as “established” if they arrived to the country at least four years before 
the survey. I focus on immigration from Latin American countries and ignore the 
reduction in the stock of Europeans. There are two reasons for this decision, first, 
most of the European immigrants who participate in the labour force arrived to the 
country as children and second, the stock decline of European immigrants is mainly 
due to retirement of workers who arrived during the 50s. Table A2 in the Appendix 
shows evidence supporting these arguments. The median age of male European 
immigrants participating in the labour force was already high in 1993 (53 years old) 
and increased over the last 20 years. The median age of arrival is below 12 in any 
survey and around 6 in the last 5 years with available information. The median year 
of arrival is 1952 in almost all the surveys14. These characteristics suggest that 
established European immigrants are highly assimilated to the local labour market 
                                                                    
12 Gasparini and Cruces (2010) uses a similar index to evaluate the effect of a Conditional 
Cash Transfers program. 
13 Note however that all the models discussed in this paper use time fixed effects and time 
interactions which absorb any proportional difference affecting all wages in the same period. 
Therefore, the under/over estimation of the true inflation does not change the results. 
14 Similar calculations for LAC immigrants show that median age is around 40 years and 
constant in all the period, median age at arrival over 20 years and median year of arrival 
rapidly increased from 1973 to 1984 during the 10 years with available information. 
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in the considered period. Based on these facts, I do not distinguish between natives 
and established Europeans in the basic specification;  
Finally, following the standard assumption in the literature, the measure of 
labour supply is the number of individuals participating in the labour force instead 
of the size of the working population. This assumption ignores the non-trivial 
relationship between unemployment and wages but restrict the measure of labour 
supply to changes in labour participation and migration shocks. 
Table 3 presents the share of LAC immigrants and the mean hourly wage of 
native men aged 18-65 for age-education cells in all periods. For presentation 
purposes, I group the age categories into 6 groups instead of 12 as in the rest of 
analysis. There are some repeated patterns like the drop in wages during the crisis 
period 2001-2004. Over the same period the share of immigrants seems to increase 
in some cells like those aged 34-41. This effect can be partly explained by selective 
emigration of high skilled natives during the crisis period. Beyond these figures, 
there is a large heterogeneity across cells and time in migration shares.  
 
Percentage of immigrants and mean hourly wage by education-age cell. 18 
urban areas. Employed men 18-65
 
 
Education 
level
Age 
group
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5
18-25 3.3 3.5 3.5 4.4 8.0 2.4 2.1 1.6 1.9 2.3
26-33 6.0 6.6 5.3 7.2 7.6 2.8 2.6 2.0 2.3 2.9
34-41 6.7 7.7 8.4 7.3 5.7 2.9 2.9 2.2 2.7 3.1
42-49 7.1 8.3 6.7 6.5 7.7 3.2 3.0 2.5 2.9 3.4
50-57 7.1 7.9 7.6 6.7 5.5 3.3 3.2 2.5 2.9 3.5
58-65 5.0 8.1 8.6 7.8 8.4 3.4 3.3 2.5 3.1 3.6
18-25 2.8 2.9 2.0 2.9 3.8 2.6 2.3 1.7 2.2 2.6
26-33 5.3 5.5 4.3 5.0 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.3 2.8 3.1
34-41 5.4 6.3 7.4 6.8 4.5 3.9 3.3 2.6 3.1 3.6
42-49 6.2 5.5 5.1 6.2 6.9 4.3 4.2 3.0 3.5 3.9
50-57 6.4 7.4 7.8 7.7 6.5 4.7 4.5 3.1 3.5 3.9
58-65 3.0 7.2 7.0 6.6 6.0 4.5 4.6 3.3 3.9 4.1
18-25 2.3 2.2 2.4 3.3 3.9 3.3 3.3 2.5 3.1 3.5
26-33 4.9 4.7 3.7 4.0 4.6 4.5 4.2 3.2 3.6 4.2
34-41 4.4 4.9 6.7 5.8 6.7 5.5 5.3 3.8 4.3 4.9
42-49 4.3 6.0 5.3 6.9 5.9 6.2 6.0 4.6 4.8 5.2
50-57 3.5 3.7 5.0 4.8 5.2 6.8 6.8 4.8 5.2 5.2
58-65 2.7 4.7 4.9 5.3 6.1 6.8 6.8 5.0 5.3 5.3
18-25 0.5 4.0 1.1 2.6 2.9 4.7 4.9 4.4 3.9 4.8
26-33 2.2 1.4 2.0 2.5 2.6 8.1 7.5 5.7 5.7 6.0
34-41 2.5 2.9 2.1 3.0 2.1 9.3 9.1 7.1 6.9 7.2
42-49 2.4 1.2 2.0 3.4 2.3 11.3 11.4 7.9 7.8 8.0
50-57 3.3 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.3 11.6 12.4 9.3 8.1 8.5
58-65 3.5 2.5 3.4 1.9 2.0 11.4 13.6 8.9 8.6 8.6
Notes: t=1: [1993-1996]; t=2: [1997-2000]; t=3: [2001-2004]; t=4: [2005-2008]; t=5: [2009-2012]. Wages are
measured in constant prices. Source: Own calculations using SEDLAC and EPH survey
High school 
graduated or 
university 
dropouts
University-
professional
Share of LAC immigrants (%) Mean hourly wage of natives
Primary or 
less
High school 
droputs
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Identification of the structural equations (7) and (9) relies on the validity of the 
CES framework. Some cautionary notes about this point have been raised in recent 
literature (see Aydemir and Borjas, 2011, Dustmann and Preston, 2011, Dustmann, 
Frattini and Preston, 2012). Alternatively, a first approach to the effect of 
immigration on wages without relying on further structural assumptions is the 
estimation of the following reduced form wage equation proposed by Borjas (2003): 
(10) log ( ) ( ) ( )
ineat meat e a t e t a t a e ineat ineat
w P d d d d d d d d d X             
where 
meat
P  is the share of immigrant labour force on the total supply of workers with 
education e, and experience a at time t. The variables , ,
e a t
d d d  are education, 
experience and time fixed effects. Interactions capture education and experience 
specific time trends as well as any possible interaction between education and 
experience. Therefore, fixed effects and interactions absorb any effect on wages 
produced by a shift in the total number of workers, changes in the skill or age 
composition of the labour supply and any possible specific change in the age-
experience cells. Since the triple interaction 
a e t
d d d  is omitted, identification is 
achieved through changes in the immigrant composition of each experience-skill cell 
across time. Under perfect substitution between natives and immigrants (i.e. 
ct ct ctL N M  for every cell c), equation (10) can be easily derived as a first order 
approximation of the equilibrium market condition when the cell-specific labour 
demand takes the (generic) form: log logct ct ctw L  and the supply of native 
workers at cell c respond to changes in wages according to  
/ log
ct ct ct ct
N N w    (see Borjas, 2003). The expression is derived as the 
difference in wages relative to a counterfactual scenario of no immigration.  
If the share of immigrants varies exogenously within cells, φ can be interpreted 
as the causal (partial) effect of a shift in the supply of immigrants on the wage of 
native workers. In this context, exogeneity means uncorrelation between the 
migration inflow and any cell-specific shock. For instance, a potential violation of 
exogeneity is produced when individuals migrate anticipating a future productivity 
boom, since this confounds the change in wages produced by the increase in the 
labour supply with the increase in the demand. Nevertheless, this bias is positive 
and a negative value of φ should be interpreted as a lower bound. Similarly, 
identification can be undermined if immigrants enter to cells where the demand is 
simultaneously falling. When demand shocks are independent across countries, this 
behaviour is a very unlikely prediction since immigrants should be attracted to 
growing-demand sectors, nevertheless, if the demand in the same cell is falling faster 
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in the country of origin, this is an important concern. Related works have not been 
able to solve this issue when dealing with non-experimental data15 but something 
can be inferred by including (potentially endogenous) controls at demand level 
within each cell (Bratsberg et al, 2011). 
An additional caveat is the potential selectivity bias produced by non-random 
dropping of native population from labour force when shifts in the supply reduce 
wages below the reservation wage of marginal workers. Selectivity problem is 
difficult to control even with panel data because Equation (10) is semi-saturated and 
residual variation is usually very low. In the context of Argentinean labour market, 
the non-random emigration of native population in reaction to falling wages is also 
a potential source of endogeneity since it artificially increases the share of 
immigrants when wages are relative low.  
The Borjas’ setting (Eq. 10) has the additional problem that φ also accounts for 
the increase in the share of immigrants due to changes in the size of native labour 
force. On the top of that, its interpretation is not strongly connected with the 
theoretical model discussed before. Indeed, it is possible that the size of some cells 
grow over time due for example to a secular increase in the education of the native 
population. If the inflow of immigrants is biased toward these growing cells, the 
estimations of φ will be negatively biased. An alternative equation can be derived 
from (7) keeping the assumption that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes 
within cells in the production function ( 1). Under this assumption, the wage 
equation can be written as:  
log log ( )log ( 1)log( )
neat t et ea t et neat eat meat
w Y v L L L b L          
Defining ( / )
meat meat neat
R L L  as the ratio of immigrants to natives within each cell 
and using the fact that log(1 )x x   for small x, it is straightforward to show that the 
following approximation holds: 
log log ( )log ( 1)log ( 1)
neat t et ea t et neat eat meat
w Y v L L L b R           
An estimable reduced form equivalent to the last equation is given by: 
(11)  log log ( ) ( ) ( )
ineat meat neat e a t e t a t a e ineat
w R L d d d d d d d d d             
                                                                    
15 Card (1991) estimation of the impact of the Mariel’s Boatlift event is a well-known example 
of quasi-experimental variation of the immigrant labour supply. Other examples using quasi-
experimental variation of immigrants are Glitz (2012), De Silva et al. (2010), and Hunt (1992). 
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Obviously, the main concern when implementing (10) or (11) is the potential 
endogeneity of 
neat
L , 
meat
R and 
meat
P . In the next sub-section, I discuss alternative IV 
strategies to cope with the potential endogeneity of the immigrant share/ratio.  
The reduced form version for the Borjas’ model with imperfect substitution 
between immigrant groups is given by: 
(12) 
1
log ( ) ( ) ( )
J
ineat j jmeat e a t j e t a t a e ineat
j
w P d d d d d d d d d d

              
This simply corresponds to replacing the share/ratio of immigrants by similar 
measures but disaggregated by country of origin. Note that the assumption that all 
immigrants are perfect substitutes with natives independently of the country of 
origin (and provide similar efficiency units) imposes the testable constraint 
1 2 ... M     in (12). Similarly, perfect substitution between immigrant groups 
would imply that 
meat jmeatj
R R  in equation (11) which is also a testable hypothesis. 
In this work, I will focus on immigrants from Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay since they account for most of immigration.  
To see an example of why heterogeneity could be relevant, Tables A3 and A4 in 
the appendix shows the distribution of high and low educated workers across 
industries by country of origin. There are important differences in the cross-country 
pattern. For example in the period 1993-1996 44% of the Bolivian low skilled 
immigrants worked in the construction sector whereas only 12% of the low skilled 
Peruvian immigrants worked in this sector. The differences in Tables A3 and A4 are 
systematic for all countries and industries and also change over time. This suggests 
that the impact of immigration can be heterogeneous across countries of origin. 
Occupational differences could be strictly related with observed variables like 
education and age. In such case, this effect does not translate into heterogeneous 
impact within this model. However, Ortega and Verdugo (2011) find that 
unobservable factors can simultaneously explain wage determination and the 
occupational decisions of immigrants. Vela and Pattel (2007) also find that networks 
play an important role in explaining this heterogeneity. 
 
Identification of (10)-(12) requires that the changes in the measure of immigrant 
penetration along time (and within each cell) are related only with exogenous shifts 
of the relative labour supply. The key assumption is that all the changes within cells 
of education-age groups are not induced by demand changes or correlated with cell-
specific shocks. As described in the previous sub-section, the most critical potential 
deviation from this assumption is when the immigration-native composition changes 
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in response to rising wages due to a demand shift. Nevertheless,  this bias is positive 
and a negative value of the estimations should be interpreted as a lower bound.. The 
strength of the semi-saturated specification is that it controls for any type of 
endogeneity related with aggregated demand shifts even at the level of education or 
age dimension. Naturally, there is still a chance that shocks are spread in a 
heterogeneous way across cells leaving some endogenous component uncontrolled. 
 A natural way to cope with confounding demand factors is to include some proxy 
control  like the unemployment rate for native population. Although this proxy can 
uncover some bias, it is endogenous and fails to capture the whole demand variation. 
Consequently, a second IV strategy is proposed and discussed at the end of this 
subsection.     
A second identification issue is the endogeneity of the participation decision 
among natives and already established immigrants. To control for this potential bias, 
I follow the strategy proposed in Borjas (2003) and instrument the measures of 
relative supply with similar measures but at population level, that is, including also 
non-participant individuals. The intuition behind this instrument is that changes in 
the population size only affect wages through the increase in the labour supply but 
the size and the age-education composition of the population is fixed in the short run 
for natives. Similarly, changes in the number of immigrants are connected with 
changes in wages only through the labour market. Thus, the total number of 
immigrants is assumed to be exogenous once we control for the size of the immigrant 
labour force. A downside of this instrument is that it ignores the changes in the 
population (native or immigrant) due to emigration, particularly when individuals 
leave the country due to falling wages in their education-age cell. Comparing results 
from equations (10) and (11) can uncover the potential negative bias due to native 
emigration. The latter equation controls for the size of the native labour force and 
therefore is less affected by native emigration. The return of immigrants to their 
home countries in response to wage drops introduce a positive bias and therefore, 
negative values of the coefficients in (10) or (11) should be interpreted as lower 
bounds.  
An additional concern is the lack of coverage of rural areas and small cities in the 
sample. Internal migration can induce changes in the immigrant composition of the 
labour force if native workers move into large cities in response to changes in labour 
market conditions. I include the number of internal immigrants in some 
specifications in order control for this source of endogeneity. 
In order to isolate the supply variation from demand cell-specific shocks and other 
confounding factors, I exploit available micro-data from other countries to build an 
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instrument which relates changes in the supply of immigrants with variations in the 
economic conditions in their countries of origin.16   
I pool different surveys from each country into 5 periods of 4 years length in the 
same way described for the Argentinean dataset. Unfortunately, the set of years 
available for each period varies from country to country as shown in Table 1.  
Estimations for the first period (1993-1996) are based on fewer surveys than 
estimations for the later periods.17    
The first set of instruments is defined as: 
(13) 
,( 1),( 1)
1
1 J j
eat e a t
j
Z w
J  
     
where 
,( 1),( 1)
j
e a t
w
 
 is the hourly wage in country j in the period t-1 for the education-
age group (e,a-1). Note that the age group is also lagged to track the same cohort 
over time. Wages are comparable and measured in 2005 USD-PPP prices. The 
relevance of the instrument comes from the fact that negative shocks in the country 
of origin increase the incentives to emigrate.18 To account for a possible non-linear 
relationship between income in origin and migration I also include the squared 
instrument (see for example Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005 and Grogger and Hanson, 
2002, 2011).19  
Using lagged variables instead of contemporaneous information has two 
advantages. On the one hand, demand shocks can affect the wages of particular 
education-age cells in all the countries at the same time (including Argentina) and 
this could invalidate the instrument.20 On the other hand, migration is a costly 
decision and do not react instantaneously to shocks in the country of origin. 
 As a robustness check, a second strategy uses the whole set of , ( 1), ( 1)j e a tw    as 
instruments instead of the average across countries. This specification is more 
flexible but in the presence of a weak first stage, the resulting bias increases with 
                                                                    
16  Munshi (2003) uses a related strategy by instrumenting the number of Mexican 
immigrants with the rainfall level in the home village. In this case, such type of instruments 
is not useful because is perfectly correlated with the set of fixed effects and interactions. 
17 In the case of Peru, data from the first period comes from Census without information 
about incomes or worked hours and therefore I only use unemployment rates from this 
country. 
18  I avoid using also unemployment as instrument because it is less correlated with 
immigration. The main reason is that unemployment is usually low for highly informal 
markets and do not change significantly over time. 
19 The first paper claims that propensity to migrate changes along the income distribution. 
The other papers test immigrant selection under different specifications of the indirect utility 
function. 
20 Obviously, nothing preclude that some countries are affected by contagion but observations 
are separated by lags of 4 years on average and this reduce the likelihood of such effect. 
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the number of instruments (Hahn and Hausman, 2002). In regressions with many 
fixed effects and interactions like Equations (10) or (11), achieving a strong first 
stage is commonly difficult. 
Finally, I consider an instrument that exploits all the information available for 
each country of birth. Card (2001) uses the lagged regional distribution of 
immigrants to predict the actual distribution at cell level and uses this prediction as 
a valid instrument. I follow a related strategy and predict the cell-distribution of 
immigrants from each country using all the available information one period lagged 
(excluding Argentina). 21  For example, I predict the number of immigrants from 
Bolivia, with primary education aged 30-33 in period t=2, using information on 
wages and unemployment from the 6 countries of origin in t=1 for individuals with 
the same education but aged 26-29. 22  The variables I use to build this set of 
instruments are the unemployment rate, the log hourly wage, the log monthly wage 
and the average number of worked hours. 23   
An important point is that, as previously discussed for the baseline specification, 
validity of the instruments is not affected by aggregated shocks, education-specific 
shocks, age-specific shocks or any persistent process involving them because the set 
of fixed effect and interactions is also included in the first stage. As I show in the 
results section, this convenient feature also creates some concerns about the power 
of the first stage because after controlling for all the set of interactions, the residual 
variation of the instrument can be weakly correlated with the immigration 
explanatory variable.24  
 
Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) and Borjas (2003) raised an important question 
about the validity of previous studies that used geographical variation in 
immigration flows as identification strategy. 25  According to this critique, if cities 
within a country operate as open economies, supply shocks will be spread across 
them and wages will tend to be equalized. If this hypothesis is true, the magnitude 
of the impact estimated using cities or regions as unit of comparison across time, 
should be biased toward zero. Additionally, if immigrants can decide the settlement 
                                                                    
21 Using the whole set of lagged measures directly as instruments would account for 21 
instruments, leading to a large small-sample bias as discussed in Hahn and Hausman (2002).  
22 I include information from all countries to account for cross-country effects of shocks. For 
example, a positive shock in Peru can reduce immigration from Bolivia to Argentina. 
23  I use worked hours since informal work is extremely high in some countries and 
unemployment is not an accurate measure of economic conditions. In most cases, 
unemployment rate is very low since many workers perform low remunerated tasks during 
a few hours a week. 
24 This trade-off between exogeneity of the instrument and power of the first stage is one of 
the points discussed in Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002). 
25 For example Altonji and Card (1991), Card (1990), LaLonde and Topel (1991). 
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place, it is likely that cities or regions with booming wages will attract a higher share 
of immigrants inducing a positive correlation between wages and immigration.26 I 
explore this setting by replicating some of the previous results at the level of city-
education-age cell. The stratification is based on the 18 urban areas described in 
Table A1 in the appendix. 
 
Reduced forms (10) and (11) cannot be interpreted as the total impact of 
immigration on wages. For instance, the interaction terms capture the indirect effect 
of immigration on wages trough the change in cell’s total employment. 
Complementarities among education groups or age/experience groups could even 
change the sign of the impact if we also consider cross-cell effects. Therefore,  φ 
should be interpreted as a partial direct derivative which only captures the average 
impact of immigration among similar workers. Moreover, this effect is assumed to 
be homogenous across cells, which is a strong assumption. Additionally, both 
specifications assume that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes within 
each cell. The structural parameters of the model can reveal more information about 
the total effect of immigration and potential imperfect substitution across groups. 
For the model with imperfect substitution by country of origin, the structural 
parameters can be estimated extending the procedure proposed in Manacorda, 
Manning and Wadsworth (2012) for the case of imperfect substitution between 
immigrants. This extension is straightforward but beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
 
Table 4 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the reduced form proposed by Borjas 
(Equation 10 - Panel A) and the first order approximation of the CES model 
(Equation 11 - Panel B). 2SLS uses population measures as instruments for labour 
force variables. Following the discussion in Section 5, all the results presented 
throughout this paper are estimated using both equations.  
Dependant variables are the average log hourly wages and the average log 
monthly earnings calculated at each education-age-time cell for men aged 18-65. 
standard errors are clustered at education-age level to allow for autocorrelation 
within cells over time. Additionally, all the regressions are weighted by the sample 
size of each cell at every period.  
                                                                    
26 However, Card and DiNardo (2000) find little evidence of such effect. 
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OLS results indicate that immigration has a significant (partial) negative effect 
on wages under any specification. The point estimates are close to -1 for the first 
specification and around -0.8 for the second specification. The magnitude of this 
effect is higher than the effects find by Borjas (2003) for the US.27 The elasticity of 
wage to immigration can be calculated as 2log / / (1 )eat eat eatw R R  in the first model 
and simply φ in the second model. Over the whole period, the average ratio of LAC 
immigrants to native population is 0.053. This implies that elasticity in the first 
specification is close to -0.9 and around -0.8 in the second model. It is not surprising 
that the first specification results in a higher impact because it fails to control for 
changes in the share of immigrants induced by changes in the absolute number of 
natives. This is a particular concern for the case of Argentina because native’s 
emigration rate is high for periods of low economic activity.  
Impact of immigration on wages. Reduced form specifications
 
The second OLS specification in Table 4 includes the native’s unemployment rate 
as a proxy control for demand side shocks. This is an endogenous variable but 
coefficients remain very stable after its inclusion. The sign of the unemployment 
coefficient is negative as expected although non-significant.  
                                                                    
27  Borjas (2003) finds coefficients between -0.54 and -0.63 for Log weekly earnings and 
between -0.72 and -1.23 for annual earnings. Estimated elasticities of earnings to 
immigration are between -0.4 and -0.9. 
A. Baseline model (eq. 10) 
Share of LAC immigrants -1.084** -1.070** -1.106** -1.091** -0.865*** -0.808** -0.882*** -0.824**
(0.436) (0.496) (0.442) (0.508) (0.331) (0.368) (0.334) (0.375)
Native's unemployment rate -0.126 -0.122 -0.111 -0.104
(0.227) (0.288) (0.167) (0.211)
B. Model 2 (eq. 11)
Ratio LAC immigrants/Natives -0.780** -0.786** -0.797** -0.803** -0.631** -0.609** -0.646** -0.623**
(0.325) (0.385) (0.330) (0.392) (0.256) (0.293) (0.259) (0.297)
Log size of native labour force 0.115*** 0.100** 0.115*** 0.099** 0.094*** 0.070* 0.092*** 0.069*
(0.038) (0.047) (0.038) (0.046) (0.028) (0.036) (0.028) (0.035)
Native's unemployment rate -0.107 -0.104 -0.096 -0.092
(0.207) (0.271) (0.153) (0.200)
Log hrly 
wage
Log mthly 
wage
Notes: Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering within education-age cell. All the calculations are based
on 240 observations. Regressions are weighted by the sample size of each education-age-time cell. The 2SLS
estimations instrument the share of immigrants participating in the labour force with the share of immigrants in the 
population in the same education-age-time cell, lagged by period and cohort (see section 5 for details). Similarly,
the ratio of immigrants and the Log size of native labour force are instrumented with the corresponding population
measures (see text for details). The sample consists of men aged 18-65. Source: Own calculations using SEDLAC and 
EPH survey. 
Additional controls: time fixed effects, education fixed effects, age fixed effects, education-age interactions,
education-time interactions, age-time interactions
Log hrly 
wage
Log mthly 
wage
Log hrly 
wage
Log mthly 
wage
Log hrly 
wage
Log mthly 
wage
OLS 2SLS
Baseline           
controls
Include demand 
control
Baseline           
controls
Include demand 
control
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The second group of columns in Table 4 presents the Two Stage Least Squares 
estimations using population measures as instruments for labour force variables.28 
As extensively discussed in section 5, this intends to control for the potential 
endogeneity in the decision of participating into the labour force. Point estimates are 
slightly smaller in absolute value, indicating that there is some positive correlation 
between wages and the participation decision of native population.29 This hypothesis 
is also consistent with the reduction in the coefficient estimated for the log size of 
native labour force in Panel A. A positive value of this coefficient (after 
instrumenting with population size) can be explained by different effects, first, a 
strong emigration response of natives to wage drops, second, higher wages can 
attract internal migrants from rural areas or small cities and finally, in terms of the 
theoretical model discussed in Section 2, a low elasticity of substitution across ages 
or education groups.  
In order to explore the potential bias due to internal mobility, Table 5 shows OLS 
and 2SLS results when the number of internal immigrants in the cell is included as 
regressor. Internal immigrants are defined as those individuals who do not live in 
their birth province.30 This variable is highly correlated with immigration from rural 
areas or small cities not covered in the survey. The evidence suggests that internal 
mobility could explain the positive estimated coefficient of the log size of native 
labour force. Indeed, the estimates for this variable become close to zero or negative 
after controlling for internal migration. Moreover, the coefficient of the number of 
internal migrants is positive. Since it is very unlikely that internal migrants are not 
perfect substitutes with other natives, this positive sign can be caused by the 
endogenous effect of wages on internal mobility. Under both models, the coefficients 
of the LAC immigration variable remain significant. In the first specification point 
estimates drop around 20% in absolute value and in the second specification they 
remain almost unchanged. The implied wage elasticities are around -0.7 for OLS and 
in the range of -0.5 to -0.6 for 2SLS estimations. These values are in line with Borjas’ 
estimations for the US. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
28 First stage is not reported since by construction instruments are highly correlated with 
explanatory variables and F statistics above 200.  
29 Higher wages would increase the participation rate of natives (relative to immigrants) and 
this would artificially reduce the share of immigrants introducing a negative bias in the 
estimation.   
30 I do not use migration at municipal level since some urban areas like Great Buenos Aires 
are comprised by many municipalities. 
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 Impact of immigration on wages. Additional controls for internal migration.
 
Finally, the above specifications rely on a rather arbitrary pre-allocation of 
workers into homogeneous age intervals. However, an alternative approach 
discussed in Appendix A.2 shows than the sign of the impact of immigration is robust 
to different specifications and assumptions about intra-cell substitution of workers 
with same education but different age. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 present the estimated impact of immigration using information in 
country of birth as instrument. The main purpose of these sets of instruments is to 
control for endogeneity induced by demand side changes and other confounding 
factors. Table 6 uses the average wage for Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay lagged by time and cohort (see section 5 for more details). The specification 
also includes the squared instrument to account for a possible non-linear 
relationship. Figure 2, plots the relationship between the share of immigrants and 
the instrument.  
The impact estimated by 2SLS is more negative than OLS results.31 Elasticities 
are in the range of -1.2 to -1.9 in both models. This finding suggests, as hypothesized 
before, that demand shocks are positively correlated with immigration and that OLS 
                                                                    
31 Differences are statistically significant despite of the higher standard errors. 
A. Baseline model (eq. 10) 
Share of LAC immigrants -0.834** -0.778* -0.640** -0.545*
(0.361) (0.403) (0.279) (0.295)
Log internal migrants 0.086*** 0.100*** 0.089*** 0.104***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.018) (0.019)
B. Model 2 (eq. 11)
Ratio LAC immigrants/Natives -0.748** -0.736** -0.593** -0.552**
(0.312) (0.353) (0.243) (0.260)
Log size of native labour force 0.021 -0.047 -0.011 -0.088
(0.066) (0.080) (0.045) (0.058)
Log internal migrants 0.076* 0.119** 0.093*** 0.139***
(0.039) (0.045) (0.027) (0.033)
Notes: Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering within education-age cell. All the calculations are
based on 240 observations. Regressions are weighted by the sample size of each education-age-time cell.
The 2SLS estimations instrument the share of immigrants participating in the labour force with the share of
immigrants in the population in the same education-age-time cell. Similarly, the ratio of immigrants and the
Log size of native labour force are instrumented with the corresponding population measures (see text for
details). The sample consists of men aged 18-65. Source: Own calculations using SEDLAC and EPH survey. 
Log mthly 
wage
Additional controls: time fixed effects, education fixed effects, age fixed effects, education-age
interactions, education-time interactions, age-time interactions
OLS 2SLS
Log hrly   
wage
Log mthly 
wage
Log hrly   
wage
24 
 
results are positively biased. Estimations are not significant after including the 
internal migration control but the coefficients are still negative and high.  
  Impact of immigration on wages. Instruments based on the average wage 
in immigrants’ country of origin lagged by period and cohort. 
 
The 2SLS results also imply either a very high substitution across education and 
age groups or a high degree of substitution between natives and immigrants. An 
interesting result is that the coefficient of the log size of the native labour force 
becomes negative in contrast with the baseline regressions. A drawback of these 
estimations is that the first stage is not very strong with F-statistics between 3 and 
4 (significant in all cases). This is not surprising because the first stage includes a 
huge number of fixed effects and interactions that remove most of the variation in 
the instruments. As a result, residual variation is only weakly correlated with the 
immigration measures for each specific cell. Additionally, regressions exclude the 
A. Baseline model (eq. 10) 
Share of LAC immigrants -2.157** -1.942* -2.177** -1.845* -1.371 -1.324
(0.856) (1.081) (0.890) (1.116) (0.963) (1.441)
Native's unemployment rate -0.027 0.136
(0.199) (0.265)
Log internal migrants 0.052 0.064
(0.035) (0.049)
F excluded instruments 1 3.755 3.755 3.998 3.998 4.058 4.058
B. Model 2 (eq. 11)
Ratio LAC immigrants/Natives -1.631* -1.584 -1.648* -1.447 -1.364 -1.268
(0.865) (1.181) (0.946) (1.279) (0.869) (1.275)
Log size of native labour force 0.013 -0.002 0.012 0.011 -0.047 -0.095
(0.058) (0.075) (0.063) (0.080) (0.062) (0.078)
Native's unemployment rate -0.009 0.150
(0.210) (0.282)
Log internal migrants 0.067* 0.101**
(0.039) (0.051)
F excluded instruments 1 3.755 3.755 3.908 3.908 3.002 3.002
F excluded instruments 2 318.4 318.4 251.0 251.0 196.8 196.8
Notes: Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering within education-age cell. All the calculations
are based on 173 observations. Regressions are weighted by the sample size of each education-age-time
cell. 2SLS : Instrument for the share/ratio of immigrants is the average lagged hourly-wage and its
square fo each education-age cell among the five most popular countries of origin among immigrants
(see Section 5 in text for details). Log size of native labour force instrumented with the population size
of the corresponding cell. The sample consists of men aged 18-65. Source: Own calculations using
SEDLAC and EPH survey. 
2SLS
Additional controls: time fixed effects, education fixed effects, age fixed effects, education-age
interactions, education-time interactions, age-time interactions
Baseline                     
controls
Include demand 
control
Include internal 
migration control
Log hrly   
wage
Log mthly 
wage
Log hrly   
wage
Log mthly 
wage
Log hrly   
wage
Log mthly 
wage
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first period (because of lagging) and therefore precision decreases considerably. 
Figure 3 plots the relationship between the share of immigrants and the first stage 
prediction after removing the effect of other regressors like fixed effects and 
interactions. 
Share of immigrants and excluded instrument 
 
Note: Each observation corresponds to a different education-age cell 
at a particular period. 
 
First Stage  
 
Note: Both variables are residuals from a regression on the set of 
fixed effects and interactions by age, education and time. 
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Table 7 shows the 2SLS results when the instruments are included in the first 
stage disaggregated by country of origin. Estimations become even more negative 
than before and remain significant in all cases. Implied elasticities are clustered 
around -1.7 and -2.1. The power of the first stage does not improve relative to Table 
6 and F statistics are between 2.8 and 3.4.  
 Impact of immigration on wages. Alternative set of Instruments 
disaggregated by country of origin. 
 
Table A5 in the Appendix presents the estimations for the alternative set of 
instruments discussed in section 5. The first group of columns uses the predicted 
distribution of immigrants from lagged cell-specific information from Bolivia, Chile, 
Brazil, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay (See Section 5 for more details). The F statistics 
of the first stage rise above 4 after including the demand controls. Point estimates 
A. Baseline model (eq. 10) 
Share of LAC immigrants -2.449*** -2.450*** -2.438*** -2.411*** -2.031** -1.994*
(0.805) (0.803) (0.834) (0.822) (1.020) (1.098)
Native's unemployment rate -0.037 0.114
(0.212) (0.280)
Log internal migrants 0.035 0.046
(0.036) (0.044)
F excluded instruments 1 2.827 2.827 2.774 2.774 2.092 2.092
B. Model 2 (eq. 11)
Ratio LAC immigrants/Natives -2.064** -2.247** -2.032** -2.162** -1.871** -1.911*
(0.873) (0.972) (0.957) (1.027) (0.893) (1.011)
Log size of native labour force -0.004 -0.034 -0.004 -0.026 -0.058 -0.117*
(0.057) (0.062) (0.064) (0.066) (0.062) (0.067)
Native's unemployment rate -0.038 0.090
(0.234) (0.300)
Log internal migrants 0.056 0.091*
(0.039) (0.051)
F excluded instruments 1 3.559 3.559 3.439 3.439 2.764 2.764
F excluded instruments 2 178.3 178.3 122.3 122.3 112.5 112.5
Notes: Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering within education-age cell. All the calculations
are based on 173 observations. Regressions are weighted by the sample size of each education-age-time
cell. 2SLS : Instrument for the share/ratio of immigrants is the lagged hourly-wage and its square fo
each education-age cell in the five most popular countries of origin among LAC immigrants. The first
stage includes instruments dissagregated by country of origin of the immigrants (see Section 5 for
details). Log size of native labour force instrumented with the population size of the corresponding
cell. The sample consists of men aged 18-65. Source: Own calculations using SEDLAC and EPH survey. 
2SLS
Baseline                     
controls
Include demand 
control
Include internal 
migration control
Additional controls: time fixed effects, education fixed effects, age fixed effects, education-age
interactions, education-time interactions, age-time interactions
Log hrly   
wage
Log mthly 
wage
Log hrly   
wage
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wage
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wage
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and standard errors are also higher. The weak instrument problem is neither 
rejected in this case.  
The results of the following sub-section indicates that instrumental variables 
estimations should be interpreted with caution, but overall, the evidence from 
different IV strategies suggests that demand shocks are positively correlated with 
immigration flows and in this sense, the negative impact identified by OLS is a lower 
bound for the true impact. For instance, Ortega and Verdugo (2011) estimate a bias 
in the same direction. 
 
As mentioned before, the weakness of the first stage is also the price of a stronger 
exclusion restriction. The presence of a large list of fixed effects and interactions in 
the first stage eliminates from the instrument the influence of any simultaneous 
shock affecting all countries in the region, contagion processes and common trends 
in wages. This is true even for shocks occurring within education or age groups. 
In order to provide additional evidence about the relevance of the proposed 
instruments, Table 8 summarizes alternative IV estimators. This strategy to cope 
with potential weak instruments follows the discussion in Stock, Wright and Yogo 
(2002), and Stock and Yogo (2002). The alternative estimators are the Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood estimator (LIML) and Jackknife IV estimation 
(JIVE) proposed in Angrist, Imbens and Krueger (1999).32 The sets of instruments 
presented are the same than those in Tables 2a and 2b. Differences between 2SLS 
and LIML estimations usually indicate the presence of a bias due to weak 
instruments since LIML is approximately median unbiased (Angrist and Pischke, 
2008).33 In this case, LIML estimations are close to 2SLS results for the first set of 
instruments (based on the average lagged wage in other countries) but not close for 
the second set of instruments (which includes lagged wages disaggregated also at 
country level). This result could be driven by the fact that 2SLS bias increases with 
the number of excluded (weak) instruments and the second set of instruments is 
large.  
JIVE is usually described as an estimator with superior small sample properties 
than 2SLS in the presence of weak instruments34. One of the sources of 2SLS bias is 
the correlation between the error terms of the two stages for the same observation 
ith. The JIVE procedure eliminates this correlation by excluding the observation ith 
when predicting the fitted value of the endogenous regressor from the first stage. In 
                                                                    
32 An alternative JIVE estimator is discussed in Blomquist and Dahlberg (1999). 
33 2SLS is biased toward OLS in the presence of weak instruments. 
34 Nevertheless, there is recent debate about this point that can be followed in Davidson and 
MacKinnon (2006) and Ackerberg and Devereux (2006). 
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this case, JIVE estimations are lower than 2SLS and close to OLS results for both 
set of instruments.35  
Evidence from the alternative estimators do not allow to safely conclude that the 
estimated impact of immigration is as high as 2SLS and LIML suggests, but in all 
cases the point estimates remains significant and negative. Naturally, the exclusion 
restriction relies on the assumption that fixed effects and interactions remove any 
source of simultaneity in wage determination across countries. Without a 
randomized variation in the amount of immigrants it cannot be ensured that this 
assumption holds, but as discussed in previous sections, the direction of the bias 
seems to operate toward zero. The results from different IV strategies do not 
contradict this hypothesis. 
 Alternative IV estimators. Limited Information Maximum Likelihood 
(LIML) and Jackknife IV estimation (JIVE) 
 
 
Table 9 shows the impact of immigration when the total share of immigrants is 
disaggregated by country of origin (Equation 12). In all cases other than Uruguay, 
the estimated impact is negative but significant only for Bolivia and Peru.36 In most 
cases, the hypothesis of homogenous impact by origin is rejected by the Wald test. 
Further research is needed to understand this pattern. Particularly, the positive 
impact of immigrants from Uruguay could be explained by two different effects. First, 
                                                                    
35 A note of caution should be made since the JIVE procedure does not allow for clustering 
standard errors and only heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are reported. 
36 The OLS estimated coefficient for Chile is also significant when the hourly wage is the 
dependant variable.  
LIML JIVE LIML JIVE LIML JIVE LIML JIVE
Share (Ratio) of 
LAC immigrants
-2.516** -0.765** -2.211** -0.692** -4.521** -1.069** -3.595** -0.954**
(1.137) (0.340) (0.948) (0.299) (2.180) (0.537) (1.697) (0.463)
Additional controls: time fixed effects, education fixed effects, age fixed effects, education-age
interactions, education-time interactions, age-time interactions
Notes: Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering within education-age cell in the LIML and
adjusted for heteroskedasticity in the JIVE. All the calculations are based on 173 observations. The sample
consists of men aged 18-65. IV 1: Instrument for the share/ratio of immigrants is the average lagged
hourly-wage and its square fo each education-age cell among the five most popular countries of origin
among immigrants (see text for details). IV 2: Instrument for the share/ratio of immigrants is the lagged
hourly-wage and its square for each education-age cell in the five most popular countries of origin among
immigrants (see text for details). Baseline model uses the share of immigrants from LAC countries to
measure the impact of immigration. Model 2 is based on equation 11 in text and uses the Ratio of
imigrants to natives along with the size of the native labour supply. Source: Own calculations using
SEDLAC and EPH survey. 
IV 1 IV 2
Baseline model Model 2 Baseline model Model 2
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strong complementarities in the production function or self-selection of immigrants 
(immigration concentrated in cells with low elasticity of substitution). Second, the 
distance between Buenos Aires and Montevideo is short enough to allow for a high 
mobility in response to demand-side shocks which will upward bias the estimations. 
None of the instruments used in Tables 6 and 7 achieve a significant first stage when 
immigration variables are disaggregated by country of origin and those results are 
not presented.  
 Impact of immigration on wages by country of origin. OLS estimations 
 
 
This section presents the estimated impact of immigration when the source of 
variation is the change in the distribution of immigrants across different urban areas. 
According to Borjas (2003) this approach likely underestimates the true impact for 
the reasons discussed in Section 5. Table 10 shows results in line with this 
hypothesis.37 The first column includes city, education, age and period fixed effects. 
It also includes interactions between city, education and age with the time variable 
and the interaction between city and education. The effect of immigration is 
identified from changes along time in a particular education group in a particular 
city. The estimated coefficients are negative and significant but closer to zero 
                                                                    
37 Table 9 is similar to Table V in Borjas (2003). 
Bolivia -1.749*** -1.741** -1.656*** -2.017*** -1.597*** -1.591** -1.515*** -1.890***
(0.515) (0.680) (0.551) (0.747) (0.459) (0.625) (0.504) (0.694)
Chile -1.743* -1.448 -1.391 -0.860 -1.611* -1.375 -1.266 -0.802
(1.015) (1.105) (1.001) (1.071) (0.937) (1.026) (0.931) (1.011)
Paraguay -0.426 -0.209 -0.260 0.133 -0.347 -0.222 -0.224 0.028
(0.470) (0.510) (0.471) (0.474) (0.417) (0.447) (0.417) (0.407)
Peru -2.050** -1.999* -2.320** -2.211* -1.889** -1.896* -2.174** -2.096*
(0.889) (1.180) (0.923) (1.251) (0.840) (1.096) (0.861) (1.144)
Uruguay 0.622 0.372 1.028 0.932 0.597 0.357 0.989 0.917
(0.630) (0.676) (0.664) (0.739) (0.591) (0.628) (0.620) (0.684)
Log size of native LF 0.021 -0.044 -0.015 -0.085
(0.045) (0.057) (0.043) (0.057)
Log internal migrants 0.080*** 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.100*** 0.071** 0.115*** 0.088*** 0.134***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.033)
Wald test equality shares/ratios
p-value 0.0520 0.160 0.0206 0.0468 0.0500 0.171 0.0204 0.0492
B. Model 2
Share (Ratio) of 
immigrants from:
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Log hrly 
wage
Log mthly 
wage
Log hrly 
wage
Log mthly 
wage
A. Baseline model
Notes: Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering within education-age cell. All the calculations are
based on 240 observations. The sample consists of men aged 18-65. 2SLS: immigration shares/ratios in the
labour force are instrumented with the corresponding measure at population level. Source: Own
calculations using SEDLAC and EPH survey. 
Additional controls: time fixed effects, education fixed effects, age fixed effects, education-age interactions,
education-time interactions, age-time interactions
Log hrly 
wage
Log mthly 
wage
Log hrly 
wage
Log mthly 
wage
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compared with previous results. Borjas (2003) and Ortega and Verdugo (2011) also 
find lower effects from regional stratification.  
The second column adds to the previous specification the three-way interaction 
between city, education and age. In this case, identification comes from comparing 
the same education-age-city cell in different periods. The coefficient from Borjas’ 
model is still negative and significant but in the second specification it is not.  
 Impact of immigration on wages using geographical stratification. OLS 
estimations 
 
 
The third and fourth columns add the others three-way interactions allowing for 
time effects to vary across education-age, city-age, and city-education cells. Only the 
first specification remains significant in the third column and the last column’s 
results are close to zero for both models. Naturally, these findings do not imply that 
immigration effect dilutes as it is spread across cities. Indeed, this pattern can be 
driven by a large attenuation bias resulting from the high level of data 
disaggregation and the small residual variability after controlling for a larger set of 
interactions and fixed effects (see the discussion in Borjas, 2003). 
 
This paper evaluates the effects of cross-border immigration on the wages of 
Argentinean native workers over the period 1993-2012. As discussed in Section 1, 
Share of LAC immigrants -0.110** -0.169** -0.139* 0.029
(0.054) (0.080) (0.079) (0.100)
Ratio LAC immigrants/Natives -0.046** -0.032 -0.013 0.010
(0.023) (0.040) (0.039) (0.056)
Time, Age, Education, City YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time × Age , Time × Education, 
Time × City, Education × City
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Education × Age × City NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Education × Age × Time NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Education × City × Time,          
Age × City × Time
NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Notes: Dependant variable: Log hourly wage. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering within
education-age cell. All the calculations are based on 4013 observations. The sample consists of men aged 18-
65. Additional controls: Log-size of internal immigration in both models and Log size of native labour force
in the second model. Regressions are weighted by the population size of the cell. Source: Own calculations
using SEDLAC and EPH survey. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)
A. Baseline model B. Model 2
(2) (3) (4)
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this is an important South-South corridor that has not received much attention in 
the literature.  
The main source of data for this paper is the Socioeconomic Database for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). Other sources of information include the 
first semester round of the Argentinean EPH and the 1993 IPUMS Census Data for 
Peru. All the variables are harmonized following the SEDLAC methodology.  
The empirical setting follows a recent literature based on the “national approach” 
proposed in Borjas (2003) which identify the labour supply variation with changes 
in the size of predetermined skill groups, usually experience-age categories. 
Alternatively to Borjas’ setting, I also estimate reduced form that can be obtained as 
a log-linear approximation of the demand equation from the nested CES framework 
proposed in Ottaviano and Peri (2012) or Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth 
(2012) under the assumption of perfect substitution between immigrants and natives. 
Results from this methodology should be interpreted as a partial equilibrium effect 
of immigration since cross-skills effects are captured by a large set of fixed effects 
and interactions. 
The paper also contrasts the baseline results with IV estimations from a set of 
instruments based on labour market conditions in immigrants’ countries. An 
alternative specification also explores the hypothesis of heterogeneous impact by 
country of origin of immigrants.  
OLS results show a significant negative impact of immigration with wage 
elasticities in a range slightly above the estimated by Borjas (2003) for the US, 
although controlling for internal migration results in similar wage elasticities. These 
results are robust to different specifications and do not change when proxy-demand 
controls are included. Although the literature agrees that OLS can be biased toward 
zero, there are two potential confounders that need to be considered in this case. The 
first one is emigration of native population in response to lower wages and the second 
is internal migration from rural areas toward large cities. Estimations remain 
significative after controlling for internal immigration rates although there is 
evidence of some negative bias. Controlling for proxies of these factors reduces the 
estimated impact but do not eliminate its significance.  
IV estimations suggest that OLS results are a lower bound for the (partial) causal 
effect of immigration as assumed by Borjas (2003). This implies that if there are 
some confounder demand factors, they bias the results toward zero. IV results should 
be interpreted with caution, the main drawback is a significant first stage but not 
strong enough to reject a bias driven by a weak instrument problem. However, under 
alternative estimators like LIML and JIVE, the sign of the estimated impact remains 
negative.  
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The hypothesis of heterogeneous effect of immigration by country of origin cannot 
be rejected in a reduced form. Nevertheless, results are rather imprecise due to high 
measurement error and further research is needed to make additional inference 
about the size of the impact. Particularly, estimation of the structural parameters of 
the model would reveal more information about this effect. 
Finally, when the supply shock is also identified from variations of immigration 
at geographical level, the estimated impact is lower.  
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 Immigration from South American countries.  
 
Note: Urban areas covered in the Argentinean sample are listed in 
Table A1. Source: Census 2010, Argentina 
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 Geographic stratification 
 
 
 
 
Median values for European immigrants. 
 Males 18-65 in the LF 
 
Urban Area
Ciudad de Buenos Aires *
Partidos del GBA *
Gran La Plata
Gran Rosario
Gran Santa Fé
 Gran Paraná 
Gran Córdoba
Santa Rosa - Toay
Gran Mendoza
 San Luis - El Chorrillo
Jujuy - Palpalá
Gran Catamarca
Salta
Gran Tucumán - T. Viejo
Neuquén – Plottier
Río Gallegos
Ushuaia - Río Grande
Cdro. Rivadavia – Rada Tilly
Notes: NEA region exluded because immigration data is 
N/A for 1993. (*) grouped into the same urban area.
Year age age at arrival year of arrival
1993 53 12 1952
1994 50 11 1952
1995 49 9 1952
1996 51 9 1952
1997 53 10 1952
1998 53 8 1952
1999 53 7 1952
2000 54 6 1951
2001 54 5 1952
2002 55 5 1953
2003 56 6 1953
2004 56 N/A N/A
2005 57 N/A N/A
2006 58 N/A N/A
2007 59 N/A N/A
2008 59 N/A N/A
2009 60 N/A N/A
2010 60 N/A N/A
2011 61 N/A N/A
2012 59 N/A N/A
Source: Own calculations using SEDLAC and EPH survey
37 
 
Distribution of workers by economic/industry sector and country/region of birth.  
Low educated workers. Men 18-65 
 
 
 
 Distribution of workers by economic/industry sector and country/region of birth.  
High educated workers. Men 18-65 
 
Industry Sector t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5
Primary  activities 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.8 3.1 2.3 3.5 4.3 0.2 5.5 3.6 5.4 5.9 5.2 1.8 0.0 1.1 0.9 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.9 3.8
Industry low tech 9.0 7.4 8.0 9.4 9.3 10.1 7.8 19.5 16.6 16.8 6.2 5.6 4.8 9.3 8.8 9.6 12.3 9.6 13.0 12.5 36.2 22.0 6.2 6.5 12.8 6.7 6.2 6.5 8.5 9.9
Industry high tech 16.0 13.7 10.8 10.3 10.3 6.0 7.4 6.0 4.8 5.3 10.0 9.5 7.4 7.3 10.8 13.3 11.4 7.1 8.5 8.0 3.0 8.0 10.0 5.8 2.2 13.8 20.8 9.7 9.1 4.9
Construction 14.5 17.4 16.2 20.5 21.4 44.4 56.3 40.4 53.9 44.0 35.4 27.8 30.5 38.0 35.2 43.0 50.6 43.0 48.9 47.5 12.4 18.1 28.5 10.6 19.9 15.8 24.9 12.5 18.3 23.3
Commerce 26.3 25.0 25.9 25.1 24.7 23.3 14.6 18.2 13.9 23.8 22.2 23.5 24.4 17.2 17.2 15.6 14.9 22.9 14.1 14.2 22.4 35.1 54.1 52.3 55.0 28.8 16.6 30.5 28.0 23.4
Utilities & trnsprt 14.4 14.9 13.9 13.1 13.5 7.7 3.8 5.0 3.8 7.0 7.3 14.1 12.9 11.7 9.0 4.5 2.3 5.9 4.7 3.5 0.0 6.7 0.0 2.9 0.0 14.7 10.5 14.6 15.2 10.9
Skilled services 3.8 4.8 4.6 6.2 5.3 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.1 1.7 3.9 1.9 1.2 2.7 2.4 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.7 2.1 8.7 0.0 5.6 6.5 2.8 4.6 3.1 10.2 6.2
Public admin 6.4 6.2 7.5 5.0 4.6 2.2 3.4 2.6 0.7 0.5 5.3 5.3 5.8 3.1 6.1 1.4 0.2 1.4 0.6 2.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.0 0.7 1.3
Education & Health 6.8 8.1 9.6 7.7 7.6 1.7 2.8 2.0 0.9 2.2 5.4 4.7 6.3 6.0 4.9 7.2 6.3 5.1 6.6 7.0 8.7 0.4 0.0 10.2 2.5 12.4 14.2 21.1 9.2 14.9
Domestic servants 1.4 1.3 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 2.1 0.7 0.2 0.9 1.9 0.6 0.4 0.0 1.2 0.4 2.3 0.5 0.9 15.3 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 3.8 1.8 1.1 0.0 1.4
Notes: t=1: [1993-1996]; t=2: [1997-2000]; t=3: [2001-2004]; t=4: [2005-2008]; t=5: [2009-2012]. Low educated=HS dropout or less. Source: Own calculations using SEDLAC and EPH survey
Paraguay Peru UruguayNatives Bolivia Chile
Industry Sector t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5
Primary  activities 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.7 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.6 2.3 3.9 6.4 2.9 2.8 0.0 0.4 1.6 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.7 0.2 1.1 0.1 0.5 0.2
Industry low tech 4.6 3.7 4.9 5.6 5.6 24.0 24.9 20.1 25.2 31.8 2.3 3.9 6.0 4.3 3.9 7.2 9.6 13.1 19.3 17.4 3.5 8.4 5.1 7.8 9.3 6.8 5.7 3.4 11.9 15.3
Industry high tech 14.0 13.4 10.8 11.5 10.7 5.8 3.7 10.5 6.6 4.2 13.3 6.6 11.9 11.3 6.7 19.9 9.8 14.0 9.4 11.1 5.4 13.0 16.7 6.7 8.4 15.0 25.5 11.8 10.0 14.5
Construction 4.5 4.6 5.2 6.1 7.0 17.5 21.5 21.3 29.6 28.5 10.6 16.8 14.1 15.5 24.7 13.1 24.1 21.3 28.5 28.7 10.2 18.4 18.0 17.5 18.8 14.2 14.6 10.5 6.2 16.6
Commerce 22.6 21.7 22.1 22.5 22.3 24.9 19.8 18.3 22.7 14.3 31.3 24.5 26.2 25.7 22.5 26.0 19.9 20.5 17.4 22.6 25.1 28.6 25.7 33.7 37.5 27.1 24.5 19.9 31.3 13.6
Utilities & trnsprt 10.5 11.0 10.7 10.1 10.2 7.7 4.7 11.2 4.4 5.5 12.4 10.2 8.9 16.3 12.0 10.5 1.5 3.1 5.2 4.0 5.9 6.9 11.9 4.6 6.3 13.9 6.1 11.9 14.3 10.0
Skilled services 17.5 18.7 17.5 16.6 16.4 1.0 7.5 3.9 6.2 6.4 11.2 15.6 3.0 7.1 10.3 12.3 14.1 7.2 4.3 4.7 8.8 4.1 8.1 6.0 8.8 12.6 11.3 11.8 7.9 7.2
Public admin 9.7 10.3 10.2 10.2 10.5 3.3 3.3 1.4 0.4 1.1 2.4 2.1 5.5 3.7 4.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 1.3 2.6 2.0 1.3 0.9 1.4 0.9 0.9 2.9 4.1 2.4
Education & Health 15.3 15.5 16.6 15.7 15.3 15.5 9.4 13.0 5.0 7.2 13.9 15.7 16.4 13.2 12.8 11.1 20.5 18.2 14.9 8.6 33.9 16.8 12.0 20.9 7.0 8.2 9.5 26.1 13.3 20.1
Domestic servants 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.7 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.9 4.1 1.3 1.2 1.9 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.6 0.5 0.1
Notes: t=1: [1993-1996]; t=2: [1997-2000]; t=3: [2001-2004]; t=4: [2005-2008]; t=5: [2009-2012]. High educated=HS graduated or more. Source: Own calculations using SEDLAC and EPH survey
Natives Peru UruguayParaguayChileBolivia
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 Impact of immigration on wages. Alternative set of instruments 
 
 
The “national approach” proposed by Borjas (2003) and the nested CES 
framework (Card and Lemieux, 2001) assume an arbitrary partition of the labour 
force into homogenous categories. This partition is based on observable 
characteristics and workers are perfect substitutes within each cell. Although it 
seems natural to group workers according to education levels, it is not clear in the 
case of age. Different age grouping could lead to different conclusions. To test the 
robustness of results to this assumption, I allow a more flexible specification with a 
fuzzier definition of labour input categories. For an individual with age a and 
education e, define the “relevant share of immigration” ( )etP a  as a function of the 
shares of immigrants with education e at every possible age x: 
max
min
( ) ( )
a
et a tex
x a
P a x P

    
A. Baseline model (eq. 10) 
Share of LAC immigrants -2.357* -2.908* -2.360* -2.900*
(1.416) (1.586) (1.417) (1.601)
Native's unemployment rate -0.034 0.094
(0.206) (0.295)
F excluded instruments 1 5.538 5.538 5.404 5.404
B. Model 2 (eq. 11)
Ratio LAC immigrants/Natives -2.687 -2.935 -2.221 -2.930
(1.738) (1.830) (1.654) (1.890)
Log size of native labour force -0.109 -0.170 -0.025 -0.082
(0.111) (0.120) (0.105) (0.111)
Native's unemployment rate
F excluded instruments 1 2.403 2.403 4.375 4.375
F excluded instruments 2 112.5 112.5 205.6 205.6
Notes: Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering within education-age cell. All the calculations are based
on 173 observations. Regressions are weighted by the sample size of each education-age-time cell.  2SLS : 
Instrument for the share (ratio) of immigrants is the predicted cell distribution of immigrants using lagged
information from the six most popular countries of origin among LAC immigrants in Argentina. Log size of native
labour force instrumented with the population size of the corresponding cell. The sample consists of men aged
18-65. Source: Own calculations using SEDLAC and EPH survey. 
Log hourly    
wage
Log monthly 
wage
Log hourly    
wage
Log monthly 
wage
Additional controls:  time fixed effects, education fixed effects, age fixed effects, education-age 
interactions, education-time interactions, age-time interactions
2SLS
Baseline  controls Include demand control
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The function ( )a x summarizes de degree of substitution between workers of age a 
and workers of age x, within a given level of education. For simplicity, I assume the 
following triangular weighting function: 
 max 0,1
( )
0
a
a
C a x if a x B
x
otherwise
    
  

 
A lower value of 0,1C  implies higher homogeneity of workers with different ages 
and similar education. 0aB  trims the range of relevant ages to be consider as 
potential substitutes in the production function. Figure A2 presents an example of 
this weighting scheme. Only workers with the same age are considered as perfect 
substitutes. Substitution decreases for individuals either older or younger than a. 
 
 Weighting function ( )a x  
 
 
The standard approach in the literature of defining homogenous inputs within 
arbitrary age ranges, correspond to the case when 0C and aB  is defined to match a 
fixed interval of ages.  
Table A6 summarizes the findings for different configurations of the parameters 
B and C. Each value corresponds to the estimated coefficient of the variable ( )etP a  in 
the wage equation. For comparison purposes, the weights has been rescaled to sum 
up to one and the estimated model corresponds to equation (11) since the coefficients 
of the Ratio of immigrants are directly interpreted as partial elasticities. The 
estimated impact is negative and significant in all cases and this is robust to 
different configurations of the weighting function ( )a x . The point estimates change 
                                 a                              x 
 
            1   
Ba 
C 
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with the parameters B, C, varying in the range from -0.36 to -1.3. Standard errors 
are smaller than previous results.  
 Impact of immigration on wages. Robustness to age-substitution 
assumption. Different configuration of the weighting function ( )a x  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.01 -0.361** -0.593*** -0.686** -0.867*** -1.134*** -1.277*** -1.380*** -1.304***
(0.145) (0.215) (0.279) (0.301) (0.361) (0.419) (0.448) (0.478)
0.1 -0.361** -0.595*** -0.702** -0.887*** -1.134*** -1.273*** -1.378*** -1.399***
(0.145) (0.215) (0.276) (0.300) (0.348) (0.394) (0.417) (0.434)
0.2 -0.361** -0.596*** -0.713*** -0.876*** -1.008*** -1.008*** -1.008*** -1.008***
(0.145) (0.215) (0.271) (0.294) (0.315) (0.315) (0.315) (0.315)
0.4 -0.361** -0.590*** -0.672*** -0.672*** -0.672*** -0.672*** -0.672*** -0.672***
(0.145) (0.212) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241)
0.6 -0.361** -0.562*** -0.562*** -0.562*** -0.562*** -0.562*** -0.562*** -0.562***
(0.145) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203)
Notes: Table shows the estimated coefficient of the relevant ratio of immigrants to natives for different
parameter configuration of the weighting function. Weights are rescaled to sum to one. Dependant variable:
Log hourly wage. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering within education-age cell. All the
calculations are based on 952 observations. The sample consists of men aged 18-65. Additional controls: log
size of native labour force, time fixed effects, education fixed effects, age fixed effects, education-age
interactions, education-time interactions, age-time interactions, log-size of internal immigration and
unemployment rate of natives. Regressions are weighted by the population size of the cell. Source: Own
calculations using SEDLAC and EPH survey. 
Parameter 
C
Parameter B
